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Iran's Second Front 伊 朗的第二战场

*The Houthis' Bold Advance Has
Transformed the Middle East's Wars*

胡塞武装的大胆推进改变了中东战争的格局

APRIL LONGLEY ALLEY AND ALLISON MINOR

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Houthi fighters in Sanaa, Yemen, September 2026

2026 年 9 月，也门萨那的胡塞武装战士

MOHAMMED HUWAIS / REUTERS

穆罕默德·胡韦斯 / 路透社

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Seizing opportunity amid the war in Iran, the Houthis have launched a major new bid for military dominance in and around Yemen. On Tuesday, the Iranian-aligned group unleashed a wave of drones and ballistic missiles strikes on Saudi Arabia, setting fire to oil facilities in the country's south and injuring more than 70 people. Then on Thursday, after days of heavy fighting along key frontlines inside Yemen, the Houthis routed Saudi-backed government forces along the Red Sea coast and captured the strategic port of Mokha. And on Friday, the Yemeni government reported that the Houthis had seized Perim Island at the mouth of the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The takeover marks a profound shift in the balance of power in Yemen, with potential consequences for the entire region.

胡塞武装趁伊朗战乱之机，在也门及其周边地区发起了新一轮争夺军事主导权的大规模行动。周二，这个亲伊朗的武装组织对沙特阿拉伯发动了一波无人机和弹道导弹袭击，点燃了该国南部的石油设施，造成 70 多人受伤。随后在周四，经过数日在也门境内关键前线的激烈交战，胡塞武装在红海沿岸击溃了沙特支持的政府军，并占领了战略要地莫卡港。周五，也门政府报告称，胡塞武装已占领了曼德海峡入口处的佩里姆岛——这条狭窄水道连接红海与印度洋。此次占领标志着也门力量平衡发生了深刻转变，可能对整个地区产生深远影响。

Until this week, Mokha had been home to a vital part of the anti-Houthi coalition and served as a bulwark against the rebels' advance. With this offensive, the Houthis have shattered a status quo along the coast, upended a truce that had largely held since 2022, and set the stage for further consolidation of their control of the north. But the victory is also Iran's, since Houthi control of both Perim Island and Mokha, which lies less than 50 miles from the Bab el Mandeb, will allow the rebels to establish themselves as the power brokers of the strait and more easily harass shipping.

直到本周，莫卡一直是反胡塞联盟的重要据点，也是抵御叛军推进的坚固防线。通过此次攻势，胡塞武装打破了沿海地区的现状，颠覆了自 2022 年以来基本维持的停火协议，并为进一步巩固其对北部的控制奠定了基础。但这场胜利同样属于伊朗，因为胡塞武装同时控制了佩里姆岛和距离曼德海峡不到 50 英里的莫卡，这将使叛军得以确立自己在该海峡的掌控地位，并更轻松地骚扰过往船只。

The timing of the Houthis' escalation, which began with attacks on Saudi interests in July, is especially significant, given that the Red Sea has become a crucial alternative

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tightened. By attacking Saudi shipping and Saudi Arabia itself, they have effectively opened a second front in the Iran war, broadening that conflict and placing further pressure on global energy and financial markets. Iranian officials have said that reaching a deal with the United States will require ending the blockade of Yemen—a shorthand for Saudi Arabia's lifting all transit restrictions on Houthi-held territories, including the capital, Sanaa, and ending support for the Yemeni government. In this evolving regional order, Iran and its partners are trying to establish a new status quo by controlling the Middle East's most critical maritime checkpoints.

胡塞武装自 7 月开始袭击沙特利益相关目标，其升级行动的时机尤为关键，因为在伊朗战争期间，红海已成为沙特石油运输替代霍尔木兹海峡的重要通道。尽管胡塞武装领导人将他们的行动描述为地区性行为，但他们与德黑兰的结盟关系似乎已进一步加深。通过袭击沙特船只及沙特本土，他们实际上在伊朗战争中开辟了第二战场，扩大了冲突范围，并给全球能源和金融市场施加了进一步的压力。伊朗官员表示，要与美国达成协议，就必须结束对也门的封锁——这意味着沙特必须解除对胡塞武装控制地区（包括首都萨那）的所有过境限制，并停止对也门政府的支持。在这个不断演变的地区秩序中，伊朗及其合作伙伴正试图通过控制中东最重要的海上要冲来确立新的现状。

Options for addressing the Houthi challenge are moving from bad to worse. While the frontlines will likely continue to evolve, a few hard realities have been laid bare. A decisive military solution to Houthi threats is not credible. For all their public bluster, Yemeni government forces remain internally fragmented. During this week's offensive, their backer Saudi Arabia also failed to provide close air support and other necessary assistance, suggesting continued poor coordination between the anti-Houthi coalition and Riyadh. Moreover, the Houthis' gains also undermine the prospects for a negotiated settlement. The militant group is now likely to be even more maximalist in its demands and in its ambitions to assert control across the Red

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些严峻的现实已暴露无遗。通过军事手段彻底解决胡塞武装威胁的做法并不可信。尽管公开大放厥词，也门政府军内部仍处于四分五裂的状态。在本周的进攻行动中，其支持者沙特阿拉伯也未能提供近距离空中支援及其他必要援助，这表明反胡塞联盟与利雅得之间的协调依然不力。此外，胡塞武装取得的进展也削弱了通过谈判达成和解的前景。该武装组织现在在提出要求以及谋求控制整个红海的野心方面，很可能变得更加极端。

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There are no easy solutions. For now, the priority for Saudi Arabia, the United States, and their Yemeni allies must be protecting other key frontlines from Houthi advances and hindering Houthi efforts to consolidate control over northern Yemen and the Bab el Mandeb. But beyond that, the anti-Houthi coalition must finally address the fissures that continue to tear it apart and agree on a credible political vision for resolving the Yemeni conflict. If it does not, there is a real risk of greater upheaval on

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是保护其他关键前线免受胡塞武装的推进，并阻挠胡塞武装巩固对也门北部和曼德海峡控制权的企图。但除此之外，反胡塞联盟必须最终弥合那些持续撕裂联盟的裂痕，并就解决也门冲突的可信政治愿景达成一致。否则，政府阵营面临着更大的动荡风险，胡塞武装的威胁也可能蔓延至整个地区。

FROM THE STRAIT TO THE SEA

从海峡到大海

For nearly five months after the Iran war began in late February, the Houthis mostly stayed on the sidelines. That relative calm gave way in mid-July, when the Iranians flew a Houthi delegation from Tehran to Sanaa, challenging the Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition's control of Yemen's airspace. To prevent the aircraft from landing, Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government bombed the Sanaa airport's sole runway. Although the plane landed at the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah instead, the Saudi action gave the Houthis a pretext for abandoning the 2022 truce. It was at that point that the group began their bold escalation against Saudi interests and launched their new offensive against coalition forces in Yemen.

自 2 月下旬伊朗战争爆发后的近五个月里，胡塞武装大多保持观望。这种相对平静的局面在 7 月中旬被打破——当时伊朗方面安排一架飞机将胡塞代表团从德黑兰运送至萨那，此举挑战了也门政府及沙特领导的联军对也门领空的控制。为阻止该飞机降落，沙特阿拉伯和也门政府轰炸了萨那机场唯一的跑道。尽管该飞机最终降落在胡塞武装控制的荷台达港，但沙特的这一行动为胡塞武装提供了放弃 2022 年停火协议的借口。正是在这一时刻，该组织开始对沙特利益采取大胆的升级行动，并在也门对联军发动了新一轮攻势。

The Houthi campaign is clearly designed to exploit new Saudi vulnerabilities. As Iran has throttled the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea has become a lifeline for the Saudi oil industry. But since the Houthis resumed their attacks in July, Saudi oil exports through the Bab el Mandeb have plummeted 95 percent. Now, by targeting infrastructure and ships near the Red Sea port complex of Yanbu, the Houthis are

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红海已成为沙特石油产业的生命线。但自胡塞武装于 7 月重启袭击以来，沙特经曼德海峡的石油出口量骤降 95%。如今，胡塞武装将目标锁定在延布红海港口群附近的基础设施和船只上，这同时也威胁到了石油出口经由埃及向北运输的通道。

Meanwhile, the U.S. war with Iran has given new fuel to the Houthis' maximalist goals in Yemen itself. The group became frustrated by the “no war, no peace” situation that prevailed after the truce, and they blame Riyadh for slow walking a formal political settlement to the 12-year-old civil war. In reality, such a deal was obstructed by the Houthis themselves. In 2023, the UN helped negotiate a road-map agreement that would have allowed the Houthis to pay all public-sector salaries and obtain a share of oil and gas resources in return for a permanent cease-fire and the launch of a political process. It would have been a good outcome for the Houthis, who control none of the country's hydrocarbon resources and have been shut out of the international economy. But instead of taking the offer, they began attacking Red Sea shipping to show their support for Hamas in the Gaza war—all the while assuming they could return to the table when they were ready.

与此同时，美国与伊朗之间的战争为胡塞武装在也门国内的极端目标提供了新的动力。该组织对停火后形成的“不战也不和”局面感到沮丧，并指责利雅得方面在推动这场持续了 12 年的内战达成正式政治解决方案方面拖泥带水。实际上，该协议的达成正是被胡塞武装自身所阻挠。2023 年，联合国协助斡旋达成了一份路线图协议，该协议本可让胡塞武装在换取永久停火并启动政治进程的同时，支付所有公共部门的工资并获得部分石油和天然气资源的份额。对于目前未控制该国任何碳氢化合物资源且被国际经济体系排除在外的胡塞武装而言，这本应是一个不错的结果。但他们非但没有接受这一提议，反而开始袭击红海航运，以此表明他们在加沙战争中对哈马斯的支持——同时还以为，等他们准备好了，随时可以重返谈判桌。

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Yemeni government forces near Al-Hazm, Yemen, September 2026

2026 年 9 月，也门哈兹姆附近的也门政府军

MEDIA CENTRE OF THE YEMENI ARMED FORCES / REUTERS

也门武装部队媒体中心 / 路透社

During the final phase of the war in Gaza, Israel and the United States caused significant military and economic damage to Houthi strongholds in Yemen. In the spring of 2025, the Trump administration undertook more than 1,000 airstrikes during Operation Rough Rider; a few months later, the Israelis targeted Houthi infrastructure and assassinated the group's de facto prime minister and its military chief of staff. Yet these campaigns appear to have emboldened the group. By attacking global shipping, the Houthis bolstered their importance within Iran's axis of resistance. And by engaging with these powerful militaries, the group reinforced its self-image as a major regional player that was uniquely capable of liberating the

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和经济破坏。2025 年春季，特朗普政府在“粗骑兵行动”中发动了 1000 多次空袭；几个月后，以色列方面对胡塞武装的基础设施实施了打击，并刺杀了该组织的事实上的总理及其总参谋长。然而，这些军事行动似乎反而使该组织更加嚣张。通过袭击全球航运，胡塞武装巩固了其在伊朗“抵抗轴心”中的地位。而通过与这些强大军队的交锋，该组织强化了其作为地区主要力量的自我形象——唯有它具备独特能力，能够将穆斯林世界从美国和以色列的腐蚀性影响中解放出来。

Since then, the organization has intensified its effort to acquire new and more powerful military capabilities. During the Gaza war, Russia had provided the Houthis with intelligence to assist its targeting of ships. It considered providing the Houthis with advanced weapons as well, although it was ultimately dissuaded by Riyadh. Today, as described in a recent analysis in *Foreign Affairs*, the Houthis are harnessing diversified supply chains and shadowy financial networks while building up domestic production capacity. As a result, they have been able to strengthen their arsenal—even without direct arms transfers from Iran.

自那时起，该组织加紧了获取新型、更强大军事能力的努力。在加沙战争期间，俄罗斯曾向胡塞武装提供情报，协助其锁定船只目标。俄罗斯还曾考虑向胡塞武装提供先进武器，但最终被利雅得方面劝阻。正如《外交事务》杂志近期一篇分析文章所描述的那样，如今胡塞武装在提升国内生产能力的同时，正利用多元化的供应链和隐秘的金融网络。因此，即使没有伊朗的直接武器转让，他们也得以增强了自己的军火储备。

Now the Houthis think they can get the Saudis to offer them even better terms than the 2023 UN-backed road map, including war reparations. As their military offensive progresses, those demands will likely continue to rise. The Houthis also face significant pressure at home to pay long-promised public-sector salaries and address increasingly desperate living conditions. More than half the population of Yemen is experiencing acute food insecurity, with six million people facing “emergency” levels of deprivation bordering on famine.

如今，胡塞武装认为他们能迫使沙特方面提出比 2023 年联合国支持的路线图更有利的条件，包括战争赔偿。随着其军事攻势的推进，这些要求很可能会继续提高。胡塞武装在国内也面临巨大压力，必须支付长期拖欠的公共部门工资，并解决日益严峻的生活困境。也门超过一半的人口正经历严重的粮食不安全状况，其中 600 万人面临接近饥荒的“紧急”级别的粮食匮乏。

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Given Saudi Arabia's heightened dependence on the Red Sea, the Houthis may have calculated that the kingdom would quickly concede to their demands. Instead, Houthi actions seem to have steeled Riyadh's resolve to confront the group. While Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman may have preferred de-escalation, or at least postponing a confrontation until a U.S.-Iranian deal reduced his kingdom's dependence on the Red Sea, the Houthis have not given the Saudis leeway to wait.

鉴于沙特阿拉伯对红海的依赖程度日益加深，胡塞武装可能曾料想该王国会迅速屈从于他们的要求。然而，胡塞武装的行动似乎反而坚定了利雅得对抗该组织的决心。尽管沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼可能更倾向于缓和局势，或者至少希望推迟对抗，直到美伊达成协议从而降低沙特对红海的依赖，但胡塞武装并未给沙特方面留下等待的余地。

With an unpredictable administration in Washington, Saudi Arabia has been preparing for confrontation by diversifying its security partnerships. On July 30, Riyadh announced a 14-country naval defense coalition for the Red Sea that included Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti. A week later, the crown prince signed a mutual defense agreement with Turkey and Pakistan at a ceremony in Mecca with the leaders of both countries at his side. The military value of these accords is unknown, and indeed, Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are a first test for the latter agreement. Thus far, the results have been lackluster. According to Reuters, Pakistan warned the Iranians to rein in their Houthi allies shortly before the Houthis' dramatic takeover of Mokha. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan has directly entered the fight in Yemen, and Islamabad has confirmed that the Mecca accord has not been invoked in response to the Yemen war. Still, for Saudi Arabia, diplomatic support is important, given the

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对抗做准备。7月30日，利雅得宣布成立一个由14个国家组成的红海海军防御联盟，成员包括土耳其、巴基斯坦、埃及、苏丹和吉布提。一周后，王储在麦加举行的一场仪式上，在土、巴两国领导人的陪同下，与土耳其和巴基斯坦签署了相互防御协定。这些协定的军事价值尚不明确，事实上，胡塞武装对沙特阿拉伯的袭击正是对后一项协定的首次考验。迄今为止，结果并不理想。据路透社报道，在胡塞武装戏剧性地夺取穆卡控制权之前不久，巴基斯坦曾警告伊朗方面约束其胡塞盟友。土耳其和巴基斯坦均未直接介入也门战事，伊斯兰堡方面已确认，针对也门战争尚未动用《麦加协议》。尽管如此，鉴于利雅得在2015年对也门进行军事干预时曾面临批评，外交支持对沙特阿拉伯而言依然至关重要。

The Saudis have also continued to solicit support from the United States. Axios has reported that Washington gave Saudi Arabia the green light to strike the Sanaa airport, and the kingdom has asked for further U.S. support. On July 28, Riyadh teamed up with Washington to strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that have aligned themselves with the Houthis, a hint that Washington might join Riyadh in its military effort against the Houthis if the conflict continues to grow. Yet U.S. involvement is far from assured. Amid the demands of the Iran war, the administration has been keen to maintain a bilateral truce with the Houthis that has been in place since May 2025; many of its military assets in the Middle East are bogged down in the Strait of Hormuz, and expanding the war would be unpopular at home.

沙特方面也一直在寻求美国的支持。据 Axios 报道，华盛顿已批准沙特对萨那机场发动空袭，而沙特方面还请求美国提供进一步支持。7月28日，利雅得与华盛顿联手打击了与胡塞武装结盟、且受伊朗支持的伊拉克民兵组织，这暗示如果冲突继续升级，华盛顿可能会加入利雅得针对胡塞武装的军事行动。然而，美国的介入远非板上钉钉。在应对伊朗战争的压力下，美国政府一直致力于维持自2025年5月以来与胡塞武装达成的双边停火协议；其驻中东的许多军事力量被困在霍尔木兹海峡，而扩大战争将在国内引发民怨。

While the Houthis' seizure of Mokha and Perim Island puts greater pressure on Washington to respond, the Trump administration may be more concerned about avoiding new military entanglements ahead of the midterm elections: Axios reported that Trump declined Saudi requests to launch airstrikes against the Houthis after their advances on Thursday. Riyadh's efforts to bolster the Yemeni government, meanwhile, have had decidedly mixed results. In January, Saudi Arabia pushed aside

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south Yemen. Since then, the Emiratis have withdrawn from Yemen entirely, allowing Riyadh to unify government military forces under its direct command. But the Houthis' rapid capture of Mokha raises large questions about the strength and cohesion of these forces. In battle, the unified command did not produce effective cooperation between different government-affiliated groups. As government troops from Mokha withdrew, there were even reports that they had clashed with southern forces who refused to let their northern allies enter the south with their weapons. In particular, the absence of the UAE and the dissolution of the STC have alienated an important southern constituency in the anti-Houthi coalition and deprived the coalition of a militarily capable external backer. If the Houthis are able to consolidate their gains in and around Mokha, the losses of territory could deal a powerful blow to morale among government-affiliated troops and stoke further division.

尽管胡塞武装夺取莫卡和佩里姆岛给华盛顿带来了更大的回应压力，但特朗普政府可能更担心在中期选举前避免卷入新的军事冲突：据 Axios 报道，在胡塞武装周四推进后，特朗普拒绝了沙特方面要求对胡塞武装发动空袭的请求。与此同时，利雅得为支持也门政府所做的努力，成效可谓喜忧参半。今年 1 月，当由“南方过渡委员会”(STC) 领导、与阿联酋结盟的分离主义势力试图控制整个也门南部时，沙特阿拉伯将其在也门的长期盟友阿联酋排挤出局。此后，阿联酋军队已完全撤出也门，使利雅得得以将政府军统一在其直接指挥之下。但胡塞武装迅速占领莫卡一事，让人对这些部队的实力和凝聚力产生了重大质疑。在实战中，统一指挥体系并未能在各政府附属团体之间形成有效的协作。当政府军从莫卡撤离时，甚至有报道称，他们与南部部队发生了冲突，后者拒绝让其北方盟友携武器进入南部地区。特别是，阿联酋的缺席和南方过渡委员会 (STC) 的解散，使反胡塞联盟疏远了南方的重要支持力量，同时也使该联盟丧失了一个具备军事实力的外部支持者。如果胡塞武装能够巩固其在莫卡及周边地区的战果，这些领土的丧失可能会对政府军部队的士气造成沉重打击，并加剧内部分裂。

DOUBLE CHOKEPOINT 双重瓶颈

Iran's greatest leverage against the United States has been its ability to shut the Strait of Hormuz. For much of the war, Saudi Arabia has been exporting three to five million barrels of oil per day via its Red Sea ports in what has become a crucial backstop for Riyadh and global oil markets. Through the Houthis, Iran can now restrict those exports as well. Tehran's longer-term aim is to establish a daunting

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partner de facto gatekeepers for trillions of dollars' worth of trade each year.

伊朗对美国最大的筹码，一直是其封锁霍尔木兹海峡的能力。在战争的大部分时间里，沙特阿拉伯一直通过其红海港口每天出口 300 万至 500 万桶原油，这已成为利雅得和全球石油市场的关键支撑。如今，伊朗还可以通过胡塞武装来限制这些出口。德黑兰的长期目标是建立一种令人望而生畏的现状：胡塞武装控制曼德海峡，伊朗控制霍尔木兹海峡。如果这种局面能够维持下去，该战略将使伊朗及其地区伙伴成为每年价值数万亿美元贸易的实际把关者。

Although Tehran does not exercise command and control over the Houthis, it exerts enormous influence on the group. Iran's decision to send the flight to Sanaa in July, setting off the current Houthi escalation, suggests the many ways that Tehran can stoke the Yemen conflict for its own ends. In turn, the Houthis' decision to enlist Iraqi militias in their attacks on Saudi Arabia has further entangled the Yemen conflict with the Iran war. The Houthis' growing alliances with armed groups in Somalia, Sudan, and elsewhere across the Horn of Africa also suggest the extent to which their current escalation could quickly spill over into the broader region.

尽管德黑兰并未对胡塞武装行使指挥和控制权，但对该组织施加着巨大影响力。伊朗今年 7 月决定向萨那派遣航班，从而引发了当前胡塞武装的升级行动，这表明德黑兰可以利用多种方式煽动也门冲突以实现自身目的。反过来，胡塞武装决定招募伊拉克民兵参与对沙特阿拉伯的袭击，这使得也门冲突与伊朗战争进一步交织在一起。胡塞武装与索马里、苏丹以及非洲之角其他地区的武装团体结成的联盟日益扩大，这也表明其当前的冲突升级可能迅速蔓延至更广泛的地区。

In the decade after Yemen's civil war broke out in 2014, its effects reverberated into Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and finally the Red Sea. With the Iran war, the Houthis' expanding regional ambitions and partnerships, and their combined ability with Iran to affect the global energy trade, the stage is now set for a more dangerous conflagration. This time, it could be much harder for the Houthis to preserve their earlier autonomy from Tehran. The war in Yemen has long been a battlefield for regional powers. But the latest stage could see expanding involvement from Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. Rather than a battleground for regional influence, Yemen could become a platform for major-power competition centered on a

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蔓延至红海地区。随着伊朗战争的爆发、胡塞武装不断扩张的地区野心及其结盟关系，再加上其与伊朗共同影响全球能源贸易的能力，一场更为危险的大规模冲突的舞台已然搭就。这一次，胡塞武装要维持其此前相对于德黑兰的独立性，可能会困难得多。也门战争长期以来一直是地区大国的角力场。但在最新阶段，以色列、俄罗斯、土耳其和美国可能会进一步介入。也门可能不再仅仅是争夺地区影响力的战场，而是会成为围绕关键海上咽喉要道展开的大国竞争平台。

KNOCKING HEADS OR THROWING BOMBS

是动武还是投掷炸弹

Now that a dangerous cycle of escalation has started, much will hinge on what happens next. Saudi Arabia may use the recent Houthi advances to rally international support for a major campaign against the Houthis, potentially involving the United States and its new partners in the Mecca agreement. But such a response could expand the conflict without addressing the fundamental weaknesses of the anti-Houthi coalition fighting on the ground. Such an open-ended escalation is likely to favor the Houthis and further Iran's strategy of controlling the Middle East's chokepoints. A sustained Yemen war could also complicate U.S. efforts to reach a settlement with Iran. Alternatively, if the Saudis capitulate to the Houthis after their battlefield gains, it could deal a damning blow to the anti-Houthi coalition and further inflame Houthi regional ambitions.

既然危险的升级循环已经开始，接下来局势的发展将至关重要。沙特阿拉伯可能会利用胡塞武装最近的推进，争取国际社会对针对胡塞武装的大规模军事行动的支持，该行动可能涉及美国及其在《麦加协议》中的新合作伙伴。但这种回应可能会扩大冲突范围，却未能解决在地面作战的反胡塞联盟所存在的根本性弱点。这种无休止的升级很可能对胡塞武装有利，并进一步助长伊朗控制中东战略要冲的战略。也门战争的持续进行，还可能使美国与伊朗达成和解的努力变得更加复杂。反过来说，如果沙特在胡塞武装取得战场胜利后向其投降，这将给反胡塞联盟带来毁灭性打击，并进一步助长胡塞武装在该地区的野心。

TOPICS & REGIONS: 主题与地区: IRAN 伊朗 SAUDI ARABIA 沙特阿拉伯 YEMEN 也门 GEOPOLITICS 地缘政治
SECURITY 安全 DEFENSE & MILITARY 国防与军事 STRATEGY & CONFLICT 战略与冲突 WAR & PEACE 战争与和平

战争与军事战略 HOUTHIS 胡塞武装 WAR IN IRAN 去过伊朗

Yet there is still a narrow window of opportunity to prevent uncontrolled escalation and return to the negotiating table. To do so, Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government—together with other regional and international partners—will need to

The Middle East's Most Overlooked Threat



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Questions that continue to tear that coalition apart while avoiding military objectives. — Could Upend the Post-Gaza Balance of Power

胡塞武装——以及也门的新内战——将如何颠覆加沙事件后的力量平衡。然而，目前仍存在一个狭窄的机遇窗口，可以防止局势失控升级，并重返谈判桌。为此，沙特阿拉伯和也门政府——连同其他地区及国际合作伙伴——需要就一项可信的计划达成一致，以确保通过政治途径解决也门冲突。该计划必须解决反胡塞联盟内部的分歧，并化解那些持续撕裂该联盟的政治问题。同时避免设定极端激进的军事目标。胡塞武装是如何比美国更持久的



Getting to such a settlement now will require both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to agree to terms that address core regional government forces, with support of regional and international partners, to apply effective military pressure to stem the Houthis' advances and persuade them to accept a deal. Indeed, the Houthis themselves are under considerable economic pressure at home and stand to benefit from such talks, if they can be convinced that they cannot impose their will militarily. For a political settlement to deliver stability in Yemen, the Houthis will also have to agree to terms that address core regional government concerns and set out a viable governance structure.

A Surveillance Arms Race Has Poked a Gaping Hole in National Security

Ronald J. Deibert

要想现在达成这样的协议，沙特阿拉伯和也门政府军需要在区域及国际伙伴的支持下，施加有效的军事压力，以遏制胡塞武装的推进，并说服他们接受协议。事实上，胡塞武装本身在国内面临巨大的经济压力，如果能让他们通过军事手段强行推行自己的意志，那么他们将从这样的谈判中获益。胡塞武装还必须同意那些既能解决也门政府核心关切，又能确立可行治理架构的条款。



The Iran Opportunity



A Better Way to Counter the Houthis

An earlier approach taken by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is in regard. In 2021, the Houthis walked away from negotiations and launched a new ground offensive. The Saudis and Emiratis responded by mounting a major coordinated operation that focused on getting the Houthis back to the table rather than aiming at total victory. Ultimately, the campaign helped bring about the truce months later. Any campaign by the Saudi-led coalition today should be similarly getting the Houthis to take part in negotiations. But success will first require further losses on the ground and making an immediate effort to bring the Houthis back to the table.



塞武装退出谈判并发动了第二次大规模的新地面攻势。沙特和阿联酋随即展开了一次协调行动，其重点在于促使胡塞武装重返谈判桌，而非追求彻底胜利。最终，此次行动帮助在数月后促成了停火。沙特领导的联军当前开展的任何新行动，都应同样以促使胡塞武装参与谈判为重点。但要取得成功，首先必须防止地面战线进一步失守，并立即努力弥合反胡塞联军内部的分歧。

It is well past time to end the failed strategy of addressing Yemen's problems through short-term military escalation and pressure campaigns. Reviving a political settlement will not be easy or happen immediately. But the alternative is far worse: stumbling into a renewed, protracted, and increasingly regional war that, as with the U.S. and Israeli war with Iran, could prove much easier to start than to end.

现在早就该结束那种通过短期军事升级和施压行动来解决也门问题的失败策略了。重启政治解决绝非易事，也不会一蹴而就。但另一种选择要糟糕得多：那就是一头撞进一场新一轮的、旷日持久且日益具有地区性的战争——就像美国和以色列与伊朗的战争那样，这种战争可能发现，开战远比收场容易得多。

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