高盛：中国投资仪表盘：2025年第四季度：政府支出放缓与房地产下行导致投资动能减弱

原标题：Goldman Sachs China Investment Dashboard: 2025Q4: Investment Momentum Weakened amid Slowing Government Spending and Property Downturn

摘要

高盛在2026年2月26日发布的报告中推出季度中国投资仪表盘，以跟踪投资、财政和房地产的最新趋势。2025年全年固定资产投资（FAI）同比下降3.8%，为1992年以来首次收缩。高盛自建投资追踪器显示，2025年Q4实际投资增速放缓至同比1.9%，低于Q3的3.1%和H1的3.7%。报告认为，FAI近期骤降部分源于国家统计局对2022-24年高报数据的统计修正，而非完全由基本面驱动。财政方面，2025年广义财政赤字（AFD）占GDP比重从2024年的10.6%小幅扩大至11.0%，预计2026年将进一步扩大至12.0%，主要得益于央行PSL支持。房地产行业已进入第五年下行，多数活动指标较2020-21年峰值下降50-80%，房价较2021年峰值下跌约30%。报告预计2026年GFCF增速将从2025年的1.5%升至3.5%，但存在政策落实不及预期的下行风险。

主要观点

• 2025年全年FAI同比下降3.8%，为1992年以来首次全年收缩。
• 高盛投资追踪器显示，2025年Q4实际投资增速放缓至同比1.9%，低于Q3的3.1%和H1的3.7%。
• FAI近期骤降主要源于建筑安装投资萎缩，设备购置在政府补贴下提供小幅抵消。
• 国企与非国企投资差距依然显著，欠发达内陆省份与沿海地区投资分化明显。
• 2025年中央和地方政府基本完成全年债券发行配额，H1发行节奏快于H2。
• 截至2025年末，财政存款余额同比高出13%（约7000亿元人民币），为2026年预留了动用空间。
• 高盛AFD指标从2024年的10.6%小幅扩大至2025年的11.0%，预计2026年将再扩大1个百分点至12.0%。
• 房地产行业已连续第五年下滑，多数活动指标较2020-21年峰值下降50-80%。
• 房价近期加速下跌，当前水平较2021年峰值低约30%。
• 2025年增量住房政策宽松力度有限，Q4房地产贷款增速进一步放缓，部分开发商（如万科）融资条件依然紧张。
• 住房库存（以月数计）在2025年H2反弹，主要反映销售走弱；新发放房贷利率仍远高于住房租金收益率，但差距近期略有收窄。
• 报告预计2026年GFCF增速将从2025年的1.5%升至3.5%，但若出口再次超预期导致政策落实不足，则存在下行风险。

论述逻辑

报告从投资、财政、房地产三个维度构建分析框架。首先，通过自建投资追踪器指出实际投资增速放缓，但强调统计修正放大了降幅，并拆解FAI结构显示建筑安装投资是主要拖累。其次，分析财政数据表明政府支出在Q4放缓，但财政存款余额较高为2026年预留空间，AFD指标温和扩大且预计2026年进一步扩张，财政脉冲将略为支持GDP增长。最后，房地产行业持续低迷，政策宽松力度有限，库存反弹，房价尚未见底。综合来看，政策宽松和低基数支撑2026年GFCF增速回升，但出口不确定性构成下行风险。

关键展望

• 报告预计2026年GFCF增速将从2025年的1.5%升至3.5%。
• 预计2026年AFD占GDP比重将扩大至12.0%。
• 报告指出，若出口再次超预期导致政策落实不足，则存在下行风险。
• 报告未明确给出房价或房地产活动见底的具体时间。

推荐标的

报告未明确给出推荐标的。

关键图表

Exhibit 1: Our China investment tracker suggests China’s real investment growth slowed to 1.9% yoy in Q4 from 3.1% yoy in Q3

Exhibit 2: The quarterly average of construction PMI, including its infrastructure-related sub-index, rebounded modestly in Q4

Exhibit 3: Steel and cement output has declined for several years, but FAI-implied commodity demand is only “catching down” in recent quarters

Exhibit 4: FAI by both SOEs and non-SOEs showed synchronized declines in recent quarters, with a still-wide gap

Exhibit 5: FAI divergence between less developed inland provinces and coastal regions has been significant since 2023

Exhibit 6: Recent FAI plunge was mainly due to shrinking investment on construction and installation, though equipment purchases provided a small offset

Exhibit 7: The manufacturing sector’s share in FAI continued to rise in 2025, while that of the property sector declined further

Exhibit 8: Government expenditure and revenue both weakened sequentially in Q4 2025, though the deficit remained wide

Exhibit 9: Effective fiscal deficit ratio remained largely stable in Q4 2025, and well above the official fiscal deficit target

Exhibit 10: The outstanding fiscal deposit amount was RMB700bn (or 13%) above the year-ago level as of end-2025

Exhibit 11: China’s fiscal “spend-through” ratio declined in Q4 2025, implying policymakers have retained some easing space for 2026

Exhibit 12: Government bond issuance in 2025 was more frontloaded to H1 compared to previous years

Exhibit 13: Policy bank support increased in recent months, thanks mainly to a resumption of PSL expansion

Exhibit 14: China’s AFD narrowed to 11.0% of GDP in Q4 from 11.3% in Q3 on a 4QMA basis, but we expect further widening in 2026

Exhibit 15: We expect fiscal impulse to be slightly more supportive of GDP growth in coming quarters

Exhibit 16: Around one quarter of local government bond proceeds were likely spent on debt resolution in 2025

Exhibit 17: Our anti-corruption proxy remained elevated in recent quarters, suggesting possible frictions in project implementation

Exhibit 18: The pace of property easing has slowed meaningfully since end-2024

Exhibit 19: China’s property downturn continues, with no sign of a near-term bottoming out

Exhibit 20: The magnitude of decline in China’s new home starts over the past five years has exceeded the US housing bust around the GFC

Exhibit 21: Should China follow a typical “large housing bust” timeline, nationwide real home prices may not bottom out until 2027

Exhibit 22: Year-on-year land sales growth slowed in Q4 2025 across various measures

Exhibit 23: Growth in mortgage lending to the property sector has been negative since Q2 2023

Exhibit 24: Housing inventory rebounded in recent months, on the back of weakening new home sales

Exhibit 25: New mortgage interest rates remained above housing rental yields, though the gap narrowed marginally in recent quarters